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A TEST OF AN EFFICIENCY MODEL OF 
GRIEVANCE ACTIVITY 
PETER CAPPELLI and KEITH CHAUVIN* 
The authors develop a model in which the extent of use of a grievance 
system is determined by wage premiums and alternative job opportuni- 
ties. Specifically, they hypothesize that when workers enjoy compara- 
tively high wages or are faced with poor alternative job opportunities, 
they are less likely to use withdrawal mechanisms that might lead to 
dismissal (such as shirking or absenteeism) and more likely to use 
grievance procedures to address workplace problems. The results of an 
analysis of data for the year 1982 from a large manufacturing company 
are consistent with this hypothesis. 
EMPLOYEE grievances are one of the most 
common measures used to evaluate the 
level of conflict between workers and man- 
agement and the overall state of employee 
relations. There has been little conclusive 
research on the causes of grievances, how- 
ever, and none of the published studies on 
the subject consider the role that factors out- 
side the organization, such as labor market 
conditions, might play in determining the 
rate of grievances. In this paper we develop 
a simple model in which the extent of use of 
the grievance system to resolve conflicts is 
determined by wage premiums and alterna- 
tive job opportunities. The model is tested 
using data for 1982 taken from a large multi- 
plant manufacturing company. 
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Previous Research on Grievances 
Grievances are charges by employees that 
their rights have been violated by manage- 
ment actions or decisions. In most cases, the 
rights in question have been established by 
collective bargaining agreements, although 
they may also be rights established by com- 
pany policies or by precedent. (See Lewin 
and Peterson 1988, Chap. 2 for a review of 
the literature on grievance procedures.) The 
rate at which grievances are filed by employ- 
ees is an important measure of the state of 
employee relations because it is indicative of 
the underlying level of conflict between 
workers and management and of the mo- 
rale of the work force, factors that can af- 
fect performance. There is evidence, for ex- 
ample, that plants with higher grievance 
rates have lower productivity (Norsworthy 
and Zabala 1985; Ichniowski 1986) and 
lower levels of output quality (Katz, Kochan, 
and Gobeille 1983) because they have more 
workplace conflicts and problems.' This is 
' Kleiner, Nickelsburg, and Pilarski (1989) found a 
more complicated, non-linear relationship between 
grievances and productivity, and Katz, Kochan, and 
Gobeille (1988) found no statistically significant 
relationship between the two. 
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not to suggest that the grievances per se are 
the cause of lower productivity. Rather, the 
argument is that they are a proxy for prob- 
lems, not all of which can be resolved com- 
pletely through the grievance process. The 
unresolved problems can have a range of 
negative effects on employee behavior, as 
we discuss below. 
Attempts to explain the determinants of 
grievance rates have focused almost exclu- 
sively on factors of traditional interest to 
industrial psychologists, such as the char- 
acteristics of workers who are likely to file 
grievances. These studies have focused on 
individual attributes such as demographic 
characteristics and personality traits. As 
one review notes, however, this literature 
has produced no clear pattern of results; 
the only consistent finding across studies is 
that younger workers file more grievances 
than older workers (Murchinsky and 
Maassarani 1980). Other attempts have 
looked at the structure of the organization 
as a determinant of grievance rates, but 
here too the results conflict (see Gordon 
and Miller 1984). Nor do the characteris- 
tics of the jobs (Ash 1970) or the style and 
characteristics of leadership-either man- 
agement or union-play a consistent role 
in explaining grievance rates (Lewin 
1983). Indeed, it is not even clear from 
previous research whether grievance rates 
are higher in union than in nonunion 
workplaces (for example, Kissler 1977).2 
In short, the existing literature offers a 
sometimes conflicting and at best incom- 
plete explanation of grievance rates. Cer- 
tainly one characteristic of this literature, 
2 It might seem apparent that the characteristics of 
unions and especially of their shop stewards are an 
important factor, since, among other things, shop 
stewards counsel the grievant initially about the 
likelihood that a grievance will be sustained and, 
therefore, about whether it should be filed at all 
(Dalton and Todor 1979). However, recent develop- 
ments that have made it easier for workers to 
successfully sue their union for failing to represent 
them adequately in grievances cases (the so-called 
"duty of fair representation") have made unions very 
reluctant to dissuade a member from filing a 
grievance (see McKelvey 1977). Kleiner, Nickelsburg, 
and Pilarski (1989) did find, however, that union- 
related events such as strikes and union elections 
affect grievance activity. 
as of behavioral research in general, is that 
it has looked only at factors within the 
firm (see Cappelli and Sherer 1990); in 
particular, no study has investigated the 
general role that market forces or eco- 
nomic circumstances might play in shap- 
ing the grievance rate.3 A more general 
model of grievances based on a consider- 
ation of factors external to the firm is 
presented below. 
The Decision to File a Grievance 
The first point of departure from the 
previous literature is to note that the 
decision to file a grievance involves a 
consideration of the alternative methods 
for dealing with the perceived inequity or 
conflict that occurs when management is 
seen as violating a worker's rights. There 
is an extensive body of research in 
psychology indicating that when employ- 
ees perceive inequity that cannot be 
rationalized away, they try to reestablish a 
sense of equity either by withdrawing 
from the situation (for example, via 
absenteeism or quitting) or by reducing 
their effort and inputs to the job, what 
economists generally describe as shirking. 
This argument is generally known as 
"equity theory," and wide-ranging studies 
in organizational psychology over the past 
two decades have found considerable 
support for it (see Adams 1963 for a 
description, and Berkowitz and Walster 
1976 and Weick 1979 for surveys of its 
applications). 
The mechanisms of withdrawal and 
reducing inputs can be exercised unilater- 
ally and can provide more or less immedi- 
ate satisfaction, two potential advantages 
from the worker's perspective. They 
clearly impose costs on the employer, 
however, and may lead to costs for the 
employee as well, costs that we examine 
below. The procedural arrangements as- 
3One possible exception is Peach and Livernash's 
1974 case study of grievance rates in basic steel. They 
considered the indirect relationship between tight 
labor markets and turnover that, in turn, led to more 
frequent selection and placement decisions and to 
additional grievances. 
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sociated with union representation, as 
Freeman (1980) has argued, add further 
mechanisms for dealing with the problems 
of individual employees. The most impor- 
tant of these "voice" mechanisms for 
addressing the workplace problems of 
workers as individuals is clearly grievance 
procedures, although in some cases unau- 
thorized industrial action by a group of 
workers (wildcat strikes) can also be a 
means of forcing a resolution of these 
problems. And although collective bar- 
gaining is in general an important voice 
mechanism, it typically focuses on issues of 
concern to the work force as a whole 
rather than on the kind of individual-level 
inequities that lead to most grievances. 
The employee's decision to address a 
problem through grievance procedures 
should involve some comparison of the 
cost and effectiveness of the various 
methods for dealing with workplace prob- 
lems. Although grievants are protected 
from reprisals by management, and the 
administrative costs of presenting the 
grievance are borne by the union,4 there 
may be important psychological costs in 
the form of confronting one's supervisors, 
being cross-examined as part of the 
proceedings, waiting months or longer for 
the grievance to be resolved, and so on. 
These costs may vary across individuals, 
but they may reasonably be thought of as 
fixed for the kind of intra-firm, plant-level 
comparisons considered below, not only 
because the grievance process is the same 
for all workers but also because the kind 
of plant-level aggregated information we 
will use tends to cancel out individual-level 
differences. 
The costs of using alternative methods of 
problem-solving, however, clearly are not 
fixed. For example, where workers receive 
a wage premium over alternative jobs in the 
outside market, they have a greater incen- 
tive to deal with work-related problems 
through grievance procedures, because the 
alternative mechanisms might lead to a loss 
of that premium. Quitting clearly does so; 
4 The exception is the railroad industry, in which 
the costs of the grievance system are heavily 
subsidized by the government. 
absenteeism and other forms of shirking in- 
crease the probability of dismissal; and 
strikes lead not only to a loss of wages but 
also to the possibility of losing one's job to 
permanent replacements or, in the case of 
unauthorized wildcat strikes, by dismissal. 
It is important to note the distinction 
between this position and Freeman's 
(1980) voice argument. Freeman argued 
that the availability of voice mechanisms 
like grievance procedures leads to changes 
in employee behavior (for example, longer 
tenure and lower turnover). We argue 
that use of the "voice" mechanism is itself 
an outcome: the extent to which employ- 
ees want to use grievance procedures is a 
function of the costs of using alternative 
mechanisms, costs shaped by the value of 
one's current job relative to opportunities 
elsewhere, which in turn varies with 
conditions in the labor market. Hirschman 
(1970, Chap. 3) drew a similar distinction 
between situations in which voice is an 
alternative to exit and those in which voice 
mechanisms are used because exit is not a 
viable alternative. Freeman's argument 
corresponds to the former situation, 
whereas ours is closer to the latter.5 
There is evidence from other studies to 
support the general view that the use of 
grievance procedures is a function of the 
costs and effectiveness of alternative meth- 
ods for dealing with worker problems. 
Kuhn's (1961, Chap. 5) case study of 
workplace relations in the tire industry, 
for example, illustrates how slowdowns 
and wildcat strikes replaced the formal 
grievance process as a means for address- 
ing workplace conflicts. As the bargaining 
power of the work groups increased, the 
cost of using the former methods fell. At 
least one experimental study suggests that 
grievance procedures are used less and 
turnover and strikes are higher when the 
grievance process is perceived as being 
more costly to use-slow-moving, inequi- 
table, and operating poorly (Sulkin and 
5Akerlof (1982:550) offered in passing a some- 
what similar argument, namely, that unions-and 
presumably the voice mechanisms associated with 
them-are more likely to form where jobs offer some 
premium over opportunities elsewhere, because the 
alternative of quitting is less attractive in such jobs. 
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Pranis 1967). Ichniowski (1986) found 
that in the absence of a grievance proce- 
dure, productivity is lower, which we 
would explain as reflecting workers' use of 
less constructive means for dealing with 
problems, such as shirking or quitting. 
The argument that a wage premium 
may have the effect of increasing the use 
of grievance procedures is related to the 
general efficiency wage hypothesis in 
economics, which argues that a wage 
premium may change employee behavior 
in ways that benefit the firm.6 Manage- 
ment should prefer that conflicts be 
addressed through the grievance proce- 
dure rather than through the more costly 
alternatives noted above, and a wage 
premium makes the routine use of a 
grievance procedure more likely. Indeed, 
this explanation of grievance use is in fact 
a corollary of efficiency wage theories, 
which suggest that wage premiums raise 
the cost of shirking (for example, Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984) and of turnover (for 
example, Krueger and Summers 1987), 
two important alternatives for dealing 
with conflicts, by raising the costs of losing 
one's job. In other words, the wage 
premium lowers the relative cost of using 
the grievance system by raising the costs 
associated with alternative methods.7 
Model and Data 
From the perspective of workers, their 
use of the grievance procedure can be 
thought of as a simple optimization prob- 
lem whereby they minimize the costs of 
resolving their perceived problems by 
choosing among alternative resolution 
mechanisms, subject to a given level of 
perceived conflicts and problems. Condi- 
tions in the labor market determine the 
costs of using alternative mechanisms. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that the use of 
6 See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and Stiglitz (1986) 
for surveys of the efficiency wage literature. 
It is important to remember, however, that 
because workers cannot be disciplined or dismissed 
for filing grievances, the threat of losing that 
premium should not lead to a reduction in griev- 
ances. 
grievance procedures varies directly with 
the size of the wage premiums and with 
the level of unemployment in the outside 
labor market. (A formal version of this 
model is outlined in the appendix.) We 
propose to test the argument outlined 
above with an interesting set of plant-level, 
employee-relations data taken from a 
large manufacturing company. The char- 
acteristics of these data help to control for 
many of the experimental and statistical 
problems that could confound tests of a 
relationship between grievance activity 
and economic circumstances. 
Perhaps the most important problem is 
the need to control for underlying levels 
of conflict and perceived inequity across 
plants. Grievance activity might be higher 
because a plant has more problems as well 
as because labor market circumstances at 
that plant make it more desirable to use 
the grievance process for addressing those 
problems. Fortunately, the design of our 
data can control for many of the factors 
that previous research suggests might 
influence the underlying level of conflict 
across plants. For example, the plants in 
our study are all engaged in the same basic 
type of manufacturing, and we can also 
identify categories of plants within the 
firm by their function-either assembly or 
components (parts) manufacturing-in 
the overall production process. The na- 
ture of production work is largely the 
same across plants with similar functions. 
As a result, there are few systematic 
differences in job characteristics across 
such plants. 
Second, because the plants are all within 
the same company and are represented by 
the same union, there are no basic 
differences in management and union 
policies of the kind that may affect levels 
of conflict and grievance rates in inter- 
firm studies. Further, all of the plants are 
covered by the same union contract, which 
specifies procedures for dealing with 
grievances. The contract also establishes 
virtually identical terms and conditions of 
employment across plants. Finally, a com- 
pany-wide union-management committee 
reviews all grievances that are not settled 
at the plant level and attempts to apply 
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consistent solutions to such cases. This 
structure helps standardize practices with 
respect to grievances across plants and, 
more important, helps standardize em- 
ployment practices across plants. 
The design of the data also helps ensure 
that the direction of causation is clear: 
because compensation is determined cen- 
trally through collective bargaining and is 
identical across plants, we know that 
differences in grievances and in related 
aspects of employee relations cannot be 
causing differences in relative compensa- 
tion across plants. 
The variables used in the study are 
reported in Table 1 and are described 
below. 
Wage premium. Although wage rates are 
identical across plants, the extent of the 
wage premium above the market level 
varies across plants. The plants in this 
company are distributed widely across the 
United States and therefore operate across 
very different labor markets where rates 
of pay for production jobs vary consider- 
ably. The wage premium (WPREM), mea- 
sured as the difference between the 
average hourly wage of workers in the 
plant and gross average hourly wages 
prevailing in the plant's Standard Metro- 
politan Statistical Area (SMSA) for pro- 
duction work, varies from almost zero to 
as much as 100%. (Four plants were 
located outside of SMSAs, and the appro- 
priate state-wide gross average hourly 
wage was used in those cases.) Larger 
premiums increase the cost of using the 
alternative mechanisms for dealing with 
conflict noted above. We recognize that 
this aggregate measure will not accurately 
capture the labor market alternatives for 
all plant workers. The measurement error 
that results makes it more difficult o find 
significant relationships with grievances- 
making for more conservative tests of 
hypotheses-but also may bias the estima- 
tor. 
Plant type. There are several reasons for 
believing that workers in assembly plants 
should make greater use of grievance 
procedures. First, because assembly work 
is often thought to be more machine- 
paced and oppressive than the work in the 
other (parts-manufacturing) plants, work- 
ers in assembly plants may experience a 
higher level of underlying conflict, leading 
in turn to higher grievance levels (Blauner 
1964). Further, the wage premium as 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Mean Values. 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
GRIEV Grievances divided by average number of workers in plant's 22 15.1 
bargaining unit (1st written step grievances) 
WPREM Plant wage (average hourly wage for plant workers) minus gross $3.02 1.5 
average hourly wage for production workers in the SMSA where 
the plant is locateda 
UE Unemployment rate in the SMSA in which the plant is locateda 12.84 4.0 
LAIDOFF Percentage of workers in bargaining unit on layoff 25.71 16.5 
cooP Corporate assessment of cooperative relations/problem-solving at 3.52 0.8 
plant (1 = most cooperative; 7 = least) 
ASSMBLY Dummy variable for assembly plants 0.28 0.45 
SEN Percentage of workers in bargaining unit with less than ten years 45.2 19.3 
of seniority 
SKL Percentage of workers in bargaining unit with craft jobs 18.06 9.9 
DISL Number of workers dismissed for disciplinary reasons divided by 9.68 6.2 
number of workers in bargaining unit 
ABST Average monthly unpaid absences divided by number of workers 6.0 4.1 
in the plant's bargaining unit 
GRATE GRIEV/DISL + ABST + GRIEV (all observations >0, <1) 0.23 0.18 
a Statewide average data were used for four plants that were located outside of SMSAs. SMSA data are from 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Area Wage Surveys and from Employment and Earnings. All other data are from 
internal company records for 1982. 
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measured above may understate the true 
premium for jobs in assembly plants. 
Assembly work may require less skill than 
many jobs in component manufacturing 
(where machining and other semi-skilled 
work is more common), and the workers 
in assembly jobs should therefore com- 
mand a somewhat lower wage on the 
outside market. Because the measure of 
wages for production work in the outside 
labor market does not differentiate be- 
tween assembly and component work, the 
real wage premium for assembly plant 
jobs may be higher than the measure used 
here. Workers in these plants appear to 
have more to lose if dismissed and should 
therefore be more inclined to use the 
grievance procedure and less inclined to 
pursue alternative mechanisms associated 
with job loss than our wage premium 
measure would suggest. A variable is 
included to distinguish assembly plants 
from plants involved in less automated, 
component manufacturing (ASSMBLY). 
Unemployment. In addition to the wage 
premium, we include a measure of the 
percentage of workers on layoff at each 
plant (LAIDOFF) as well as the unemploy- 
ment rate in each plant's SMSA (UE). The 
former can be thought of as the rate of 
unemployment for workers at each plant. 
Both measures suggest something about 
the opportunities for alternative employ- 
ment; where unemployment rates are 
high, it is more difficult (costly) to find a 
new job if one quits or is dismissed for 
shirking. Similarly, it may be more diffi- 
cult to find a job where more of one's 
fellow workers (whose skills and job 
searches are likely to be similar) are laid 
off. Therefore, use of the grievance 
system should vary directly with these 
rates. 
These variables all serve as proxies for 
the cost of alternative methods for resolv- 
ing conflicts, and the model described 
above suggests that they should all be 
positively related to grievance rates. We 
also include other variables to control for 
forces exogenous to the model that might 
influence 'the level of grievances by in- 
creasing the level of perceived conflict and 
problems across plants. 
Seniority. There are at least two conflict- 
ing hypotheses concerning the relation- 
ship between seniority and grievance use. 
As noted above, previous studies suggest 
that younger employees and employees 
with less experience tend to perceive less 
equity, have more complaints, and file 
more grievances. The reason may be, as 
Borjas (1979) suggested, because they 
have had less time in which to make a 
good job match and are therefore less 
likely to be satisfied with the job they 
currently hold than are older and more 
experienced workers. On the other hand, 
the costs of job loss associated with using 
nongrievance mechanisms are greater for 
older workers with more seniority, be- 
cause it may be more difficult for them to 
find alternative jobs, and they may lose 
seniority-based entitlements such as pen- 
sion rights. We might therefore expect 
them to make greater use of the grievance 
process to resolve whatever inequities they 
do perceive. We include a measure of 
average company seniority (SEN) across 
plants as a measure of job experience and 
as a rough proxy for average worker age, 
but the sign of the relationship with 
grievance activity is difficult o predict. 
Craft status. There may be some differ- 
ences across plants in the average charac- 
teristics of jobs and of workers in them, 
due not only to the plant type but also to 
differences in the proportion of workers 
doing traditional craft work (such as 
electricians and plumbers). Craft workers 
are present in every plant, where they 
typically perform maintenance functions, 
but their presence across plants varies, for 
example, because of differences in the age 
and state of the capital equipment. The 
jobs of craft workers differ from those of 
non-craft production workers, and the 
characteristics of craft workers may be 
different as well, since these workers come 
from skilled labor markets that exist 
independently of the firm. 
It is not clear a priori or from previous 
research, however, exactly what influence 
the presence of skilled workers might have 
on average grievance rates. One former 
union official in the industry suggested to 
us that workers in skilled trades have more 
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complaints because their jobs are less 
defined-possibly raising grievance lev- 
els-but also are more able to get them 
addressed informally, outside of the griev- 
ance process, because of their greater 
individual bargaining power-possibly 
lowering grievances. Further, workers 
with craft skills may have better job 
alternatives than other workers and be less 
reluctant to use methods of solving prob- 
lems other than the grievance system. Like 
seniority, therefore, the skill variable may 
also capture some aspect of job alterna- 
tives. We include a variable for the 
percentage of workers with skilled trades 
jobs in each plant (SKL) to capture these 
effects. 
Cooperation. The final variable (coop) 
attempts to control for differences in the 
level of conflict across plants and in the 
ability to solve problems that arise infor- 
mally before they are filed as grievances. 
Officials from the company's corporate 
staff assessed each plant according to how 
well plant management and the local 
union worked together. Plants in which 
management and local union officials had 
good problem-solving skills and used them 
to solve problems jointly (as opposed to 
plants in which problems were addressed 
through confrontation) were rated as 
cooperative. (Management officials stated 
that this measure was not based on plant 
grievance rates.) The general ability of 
unions and management to work well 
together may reduce the number of 
conflicts that affect individuals and may 
help to resolve problems informally. 
Greater cooperation should therefore be 
associated with lower levels of conflict and 
grievances. 
Ideally, such measures should be de- 
fined in terms of actual behaviors exhib- 
ited by the parties, and the more behaviors 
the better. As is often the case, however, 
this measure was more impressionistic, 
based on the question, "How cooperative 
are plant-level labor relations?" and as- 
sessed on a 1-7 point scale with 1 = most 
cooperative. The corporate staff looked 
for the presence of joint union-manage- 
ment programs, evidence of cooperative 
approaches to solving specific problems, 
and attitudes expressed by union and 
plant management officials toward each 
other as indications of the extent of 
cooperative relations at each plant. 
Obviously, there may be differences in 
underlying levels of conflict across plants 
that are not captured by the control 
variables above. But for the purposes of 
the test of the model proposed here, the 
issue is whether unexplained differences 
in levels of conflict across plants are 
positively correlated with the labor market 
variables, a relationship that would con- 
found the test. 
If there is any relationship between 
levels of conflict and labor market condi- 
tions as measured by the right-hand-side 
variables, it is likely to be an inverse 
relationship and to work against our 
hypothesis. Workers' judgments as to the 
equity of particular management actions 
that might lead to grievances are not made 
in a vacuum, but presumably are based in 
part on their overall sense of equity and 
satisfaction with the other aspects of their 
jobs. One way to think of this argument is 
as an application of compensating differ- 
entials; if workers feel generally satisfied 
with the other aspects of their jobs, they 
may be less likely to perceive inequities in 
particular management decisions and, in 
turn, less likely to file grievances. Previous 
research lends support to this position. 
For example, the size of the wage pre- 
mium above market rates is positively 
associated with aspects of job satisfaction 
(Cappelli and Sherer 1988), and higher 
unemployment rates in the external labor 
market are also associated with higher 
levels of satisfaction for those with jobs 
(Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 1969). Where 
levels of satisfaction are higher, one would 
expect perceived inequities and conflict to 
be lower, ceteris paribus, and grievances to 
be lower as well. Further, higher wage 
premiums and tighter labor markets may 
allow plant management to hire better- 
quality workers. As Staw, Bell, and 
Clausen (1986) found, some workers are 
disposed toward lower job satisfaction and 
greater complaints independent of their 
jobs, and management may be able to use 
tighter labor markets to hire fewer of such 
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workers.8 Therefore, higher wage premi- 
ums and greater unemployment should be 
associated with lower levels of underlying 
conflict and should, if anything, operate 
against the relationship suggested by the 
model, making for a more conservative 
test of our hypothesis. 
The specification of the model is 
straightforward. The measure for griev- 
ance rates (GRIEV) is the number of written 
first-step grievances as a proportion of the 
average number of workers during 1982 
in each plant's bargaining unit. The rate 
varies between 0 and 1, and therefore a 
log-odds ratio of the variable is used in the 
estimating equation. Because the depen- 
dent variable and several of the indepen- 
dent variables are plant-wide averages 
based on the characteristics of all employ- 
ees at each plant, the estimates for plants 
with fewer employees will have more 
error. Weighted least squares is used to 
correct for the heteroscedasticity that 
results. And as Amemiya and Nold (1975) 
pointed out, the weights should include a 
correction for equation error to prevent 
understating the standard errors of the 
estimates.9 The estimating equation is as 
follows: 
8 There may, however, be exceptions to this 
argument. Greater unemployment in the outside 
labor market and higher plant wage premiums may 
also give management more freedom to tighten 
discipline and to discharge more employees because 
the supply of replacements, and presumably their 
quality, is greater. Tighter standards may lead to 
more grievances. But centralized company personnel 
policies and common grievance standards limit the 
ability of plant management o take such actions. 
Further, it is not at all obvious that stricter 
standards-if they do occur-would be enough to 
overcome the above relationships and lead to a net 
increase in grievances. Second, unions may file more 
grievances in response to at least certain kinds of 
layoffs in an attempt either to reverse the layoffs or 
simply to protest hem. Where this is the case, there 
may be some positive association between the LAIDOFF 
variable and grievance levels. 
9 Each observation was weighted by [s015 + 
{EMPLOYMENTk * Grievancesk( - Grievancesk)} l 2, 
where s21, is an estimate of the variance calculated 
from the parameters of an OLS estimation of the 
above log odds equation and EMPLOYMENTk is the 
number of workers at each of k plants. The log odds 
equation was then estimated again using the 
weighted observations. 
(1) ln(GRIEV/1-GRIEV) = 
a + bWPREM + b2ASSMBLY + b3LAIDOFF 
+ b4UE + b5SEN + b6SKL - b7CoOP + e 
We can use additional data to further 
control for the possibility that underlying 
levels of conflict differ across plants. The 
ideal measure would be one that included 
all the worker conflicts and problems at 
the plant that could have gone through the 
grievance process-not only those dealt 
with through the grievance system but also 
those handled through the alternative 
channels described above. With such a 
measure it would be possible to identify 
the plants in which the grievance process 
handled a larger percentage of the total 
workplace problems. 
Not surprisingly, no such direct mea- 
sure exists, but it is possible for us to 
construct a rough proxy for it by examin- 
ing the other mechanisms for addressing a 
sense of grievance outlined above. We 
have a direct measure for one of the 
alternative mechanisms: unpaid (unex- 
cused) absenteeism, expressed as the aver- 
age number of unpaid days absent divided 
by the number of workers in the bargain- 
ing unit. (This measure is sometimes 
referred to as "controllable absenteeism.") 
We also have a direct measure for with- 
drawal of effort associated with shirking. 
That measure is the rate of disciplinary 
layoffs, expressed as the number of such 
layoffs divided by the number of workers 
in the bargaining unit. The collective 
bargaining agreement restricts use of this 
disciplinary action to issues associated with 
shirking, broadly defined (for example, 
failure to meet production standards, 
failure to follow instructions, carelessness, 
and safety violations). 
One important withdrawal mechanism for 
which we have no direct measure is volun- 
tary turnover. The year in which the data 
for this study were collected, however, was a 
recession year (1982), and voluntary turn- 
over at that time, according to managers, 
was virtually nonexistent, since the union- 
ized jobs provided by this company were 
better than alternative jobs in the commu- 
nities where the plants were located. Also, 
evidence from other studies suggests that 
 at University of Kansas Libraries on May 18, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
A TEST OF AN EFFICIENCY MODEL OF GRIEVANCE ACTIVITY 11 
turnover and absenteeism tend to be corre- 
lated in cross-sectional data (Porter and 
Steers 1973; Mobley 1979), so some of the 
variance in turnover may be captured by 
the absenteeism variable. 
One problem is that these measures 
might include absences and shirking that 
arise not only from the kind of complaints 
against management that could result in 
grievances but also from other kinds of 
problems that cannot be handled through 
the formal grievance procedure, such as 
personal difficulties that are not caused by 
the job. There is, however, no a priori 
reason to believe that the proportion of 
nongrievable problems represented by 
these variables should vary systematically 
across plants and bias the results. 
Each of the grievance, absenteeism, and 
discipline variables identifies individual 
incidents that could be manifestations of a 
sense of inequity, and all are expressed as 
the rate per 100 workers. They were 
therefore combined into an index with 
equal weights. Grievance rates are then 
expressed as a percentage of that index 
(see Table 1). The variable that results 
(GRATE) can be thought of as a rough 
proxy for the percentage of potentially 
grievable workplace problems that were 
actually addressed through the grievance 
procedure.'0 This variable is bounded 
between 0 and 1 and is therefore ex- 
pressed in the form of a log-odds ratio 
[ln(GRATE)/1 - GRATE)]. This variable is 
then regressed on the same set of inde- 
pendent variables used above: 
(2) ln(GRATE/I - GRATE) = a + bWPREM 
+ b2ASSMBLY + b3LAIDOFF 
+ b4UE + b5SEN ? b6SKL - b7CoOP + e 
10 No doubt there is covariance among grievances, 
absenteeism, and disciplinary actions-for example, 
many disciplinary actions will be grieved-and 
therefore the inclusion of absence and discipline 
adds less information than one might have hoped 
for. But it is also clear that these three measures are 
far from identical and that some information is 
therefore gained as a result of including all of them. 
There were no shop floor or wildcat strikes, an 
alternative method for dealing with problems that 
extend to groups, during the period considered 
here. 
Results 
The results are presented in Table 2. 
Beginning with equation (1), the wage 
premium (WPREM) is positively and signifi- 
cantly related to grievance rates, suggest- 
ing that the use of grievance procedures 
does increase as the wage premium rises 
because the costs of using alternative 
methods for conflict resolution rise. Simi- 
larly, plant-level unemployment (LAIDOFF) 
Table 2. Effects of Wage Premiums and 
Alternative Job Opportunities on Grievance 
Rates in a Manufacturing Firm, 1982: 
Regression Results for Log-Odds Grievance 
Measures Across Plants. 
(Weighted Least Squares) 
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Dependent Variable GRIEV GRATE 
Intercept - 4.37*** -0.275*** 
(4.60) (1.64) 
WPREM 0.46*** 0.069*** 
(4.37) (3.68) 
UE 0. 10*** 0.014** 
(2.64) (2.08) 
LAIDOFF 0.008* 0.008* 
(1.65) (1.90) 
cooP -0.13 - 0.0056 
(1.21) (0.28) 
ASSMBLY 0.56** 0.096** 
(2.40) (2.36) 
SEN 0.008 0.0014 
(1.52) (1.55) 
SKL 0.014 0:0023 
(1.25) (1.16) 
R2 = .46 .41 
R2 = .41 .35 
Standard Error 
of Estimate: 
SSE = 118306.67 3016.02 
SSR = 144223.57 4377.07 
F = 9.55 7.68 
n = 86 86 
Note: T statistics are in parentheses. All of the 
values for both dependent variables were between 0 
and 1. R2s, F statistics, and SSE and SSR estimates 
may not have the usual interpretations when using 
weighted log-odds regressions and are reported here 
only for illustrative purposes. Similar results were 
otained using other specifications, such as In 
(WPREM), and are available from the authors. 
* Statistically significant a the .10 level: ** at the 
.05 level; *** at the .01 level 
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and unemployment in the plant's SMSA 
(UE) are both positively and significantly 
related to grievances; where unemploy- 
ment is higher, the costs associated with 
finding alternative work rise, and the costs 
of using the alternatives to the grievance 
process (which increase the probability of 
dismissal) therefore rise as well. The 
elasticities for these labor market variables 
are large (1.0 for WPREM, 1.01 for UE, and 
.16 for LAIDOFF), suggesting that these 
relationships are empirically important. 
For example, a one percent increase in the 
wage premium is associated with a one 
percent increase in grievance levels. These 
measures are essentially cross-price elastic- 
ities that examine the effects of price 
changes for substitutes on the demand for 
some alternative. 
The variable identifying assembly plants 
(ASSMBLY) suggests that workers at those 
plants use the grievance procedure more 
extensively than those at other plants (parts- 
manufacturing plants), possibly because they 
have more to lose from unemployment given 
their greater wage premiums. The variable 
identifying the extent of cooperative rela- 
tions between plant management and labor 
(coop) has the predicted signs but fails to 
achieve conventional evels of significance. 1 1
The variables for seniority (SEN) and skill 
(SKL) also fail to achieve significant relation- 
ships. 
The results for equation (2) are virtually 
identical to those for equation (1). Bearing 
in mind the limitations noted above con- 
cerning the dependent variable, the results 
suggest that a greater proportion of work- 
place problems are addressed through the 
grievance procedure when the costs associ- 
ated with using alternative methods in- 
crease. Because of the possibility that the 
component variables in the denominator 
might be determined simultaneously with 
1 A reciprocal specification of the variable - 
1/coop-yields a coefficient significant at the 10% 
level, suggesting that cooperative relations may have 
a nonlinear relationship with grievance rates. We also 
examined other specifications of the equation, such 
as one in which absenteeism and discipline were 
included as separate R.H.S. variables, and observed 
no important effects on the results. These results are 
available on request. 
the grievance level, we examined this result 
further with a two-stage least squares re- 
gression to generate an instrumental vari- 
able for the denominator. The results, avail- 
able on request, are virtually identical to 
those in Table 2. Separate F tests suggest 
that the labor market variables (WPREM, ASSM- 
BLY, LAIDOFF, and UE) when taken together 
have a significant relationship with both de- 
pendent variables at the one percent level. 
The conflict control variables (SEN, SKL, and 
coop) are jointly significant at the 10% level. 
(We recognize that several variables capture 
aspects of both labor markets and conflict, 
which may confound this test.) 
The elasticities for the labor market vari- 
ables in equation (2) provide a means for 
examining the substitution across problem- 
solving mechanisms that results from 
changes in their relative costs. These elas- 
ticities represent the change in the propor- 
tion of problems dealt with through the 
grievance process that is associated with a 
change in the relative price of alternatives. 
They are .83 for WPREM, .74 for UE, and .13 
for LAIDOFF. Thus, for example, the results 
suggest that doubling the wage premium 
will increase the proportion of problems 
addressed through grievances by 83%.12 
Conclusions 
Despite the fact that grievance processes 
are among the most important aspects of 
employment relations and grievance rates 
are a standard measure of the state of 
employee relations, the previous literature 
has produced few, if any, sustainable 
explanations about the determinants of 
grievance activity. In particular, no previ- 
ous research has looked at factors outside 
the firm, such as labor market conditions, 
to explain grievance rates. We have pro- 
12 Where e = d(QIQ)QIQ/d(PIPa)IPgPa. Be- 
cause the equation is in a log-odds form, the elasticity 
is computed as (GRATE* - GRATE)/GRATE, where 
GRATE* = ed/1 + ed and d = (lnGRATE/1 - GRATE) + 
(bwPREM(.O1)WPREM). The elasticities also suggest 
that the production function for equity that relates 
grievances and alternative mechanisms to conflict 
resolution may be of the Cobb-Douglas form, given 
that elasticities of substitution under that function 
are unitary. 
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posed a simple model in which workers 
choose the grievance process from among 
a set of alternative methods for addressing 
workplace conflicts, and the extent to 
which the grievance process is used de- 
pends on the relative costs of the various 
methods. 
Consistent with our model, our analysis 
of data from a large, multi-plant manufac- 
turing firm has shown that the greater the 
advantages of workers' current jobs, as 
indicated by wage premiums or high levels 
of unemployment in the outside market, 
the greater their use of grievance proce- 
dures-presumably reflecting the greater 
costs of using alternative methods to 
resolve problems (such as shirking or 
absenteeism), which generally lead to at 
least an increased risk of job loss. One way 
to think of this result is in terms of a 
demand by workers for the use of voice 
mechanisms like grievance procedures 
that varies with the price of using such 
mechanisms. These results also suggest an 
extension of the basic efficiency wage 
argument. The potential gains associated 
with a wage premium may include greater 
use of institutionalized grievance proce- 
dures and a reduction in the use of 
alternatives such as quitting, absenteeism, 
and shirking, alternatives that may be 
more costly for employers. 
APPENDIX 
Following is a formal version of the model used in 
this study, in which the extent to which workers use 
grievance procedures is hypothesized to vary directly 
with the size of their wage premiums and with the 
level of unemployment in the outside labor market. 
(A1) MinC=aPg+ bPa 
where Pg is the price of using the grievance 
procedure, Pa is the price of using alternative 
procedures, and Pg., Pa > 0. 
Subject to a given level of inequity that must be 
addressed, Qt = Q(ga), the first-order condition for 
minimizing C requires solving the Lagrangian: 
(A2) Z =aPg + bPa + u[Q - Q(g, a)] 
and the following first-order conditions: 
Ztx = - Q(g, a) = O 
g ~ P- u - zg =p Pg 'g 
Za = P- UQ = 0. 
Because the form of the production function is 
unknown and may not be strictly quasi-convex, the 
second-order condition requires the following nega- 
tive bordered Hessian: 
(A3) H = (QaQ -2QgQQb+QggQ) < 0 
where u = marginal cost of production or = PaI/P 
- aQa/Q.g The outcome of the optimization should 
yield: 
(A4) QgQ, > 0 and 
aQIaPa > 0, a2Q/a2Pa < 0 
aQglaPg < 0, a2WQa/2Pg < 0. 
Testing the hypothesis described above will 
amount to testing whether aQwaPa > 0. 
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